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Summary findings
To predict how Algeria's unemployment crisis will  would be persistent. A more moderate "mixed bang"
evolve, Ruppert evaluates the Algerian unemployment  approach would incorporate active employment
insurance system's ability to finance itself, to affect  measures to mitigate entrenched unemployment. A
employment decisions (of both firms and workers), and  crucial function of such policies is to maintain or
to promote  enterprise restructuring (with attention to  enhance human capital through work (learning by
long-term implications for the labor market).  doing), so idle workers don't  lose their skills. Flex-time
Her main conclusion: Industrial restructuiing  has  arrangements would help workers maintain a degree of
serious and persistent implications for the labor market.  attachmenit to the labor force. However minor, such
In an environment where many equilibria are possible,  work would help workers avoid the traps of long-term
there is a real danger of reaching a high unemployment  unemployment.
equilibrium.  Two striking conclusions emerge from the Central and
The big-bang experience of structural adjustment in  Eastern European experience:
the transition economies of Central  and Eastern Europe  * Unemploynment  is not essential to enterprise
resulted in large-scale unemployment. Despite  restructuring and labor market adjustment. Private sector
considerable progress in restructuring, structiiral  vacancies are filled by job-to-job shifts, without recourse
rigidities still exist in the labor market there, and long-  to the unemployment pool.
term unemployment has persisted. Boeri (1993) calls this  Growing long-term unemployment is self-fulfilling
"transitional unemployment" and  argues that it is  and results in higher and persistent unemployment.
difficult to eliminate by reintegration  into the labor  Although active employment measures are costly and
force.  have relatively low rates of return in the short run, they
One advantage of the big-bang approach is the speed  can be marginally effective as part of a long-term
of adjustment, but the unemploE  nment  that results may bt  strategy.
too costly for Algeria's economy, especialiv becanst- it
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1.  In an environment of high unemployment, persistent economic stagnation and social
and political  unrest, and confronted by tighter fiscal constraints due to weak world oil prices
and diminished access to foreign financing, the Algerian authorities undertook an extensive
program of policy reform and structural adjustment.  Currently in  transition from central
planning to a market economy, Algeria, like its counterparts in Central and Eastern Europe,
faces a dilemma. On the one hand, it must correct the macroeconomic  imbalances  endemic  to
the socialist model because its economy  is stagnating  and losing competitiveness,  and it faces
balance of payments and fiscal constraints due to high debt servicing obligations and rising
subsidization  of its population.  On the other hand, structural reform is onerous due to  its
scope, and its consequences  for workers laid off in the process of enterprise restructuring. In
July,  1994, the Algerian authorities adopted a national unemployment  insurance scheme to
protect workers laid off during the period of adjustment.
2.  Unemployment insurance is  a  policy mechanism to  achieve certain objectives for
overall employment  levels, firms' lay-off  behavior, workers' job search behavior, and worker
protection.  This paper seeks to analyze the Algerian system design in the context of recent
international  experience.  The first section examines a variety of policy variables typical of
unemployment  insurance schemes, and the theoretic implications for the labor market.  The
experience  of the transitional economies  of Central and Eastern Europe provides insight into
the evolution  of employment  and unemployment  in the face of various employment  policies.
Section  II discusses  labor market policy and theory in the context of the dynamic  Burda model.
The third section raises the  principal objectives in  designing an unemployment insurance
scheme.  Section IV describes and evaluates  the Algerian system's eligibility criteria, benefit
parameters and financing measures, and derives conclusions based on the dynamic model
discussed in the second section.  Section V presents an analysis of the potential costs of the
system, based on a model that estimates the projected financial viability of the system by
simulating  a range of employment  profiles and parameters. Finally, the paper concludes  with
international evidence on  labor  market  policies  and  their  effect  on  the  evolution  of
unemployment.
Section  I:  Unemployment  Insurance  in Central  and Eastern  Europe
3.  In a well-functioning  and minimally regulated labor market, wages and employment
determine an equilibrium allocation of labor that is Pareto optimal.  Market failures emerge,
however, due to impediments  to competition  such as asymmetric information,  and the delays
in adjustment  and reallocation  associated  with the contractual  nature of labor agreements. The
resulting inequitable distribution of income and lack of protection for workers provides a
rationale for government intervention. The fundamental  purpose of unemployment  insurance
(UI) is to smooth income over time by insuring against unexpected drops in income in the
event of job separation.  In the case of economies  undergoing adjustment,  this takes the form
of poverty alleviation. Mandatory  schemes  typically  pursue the additional  objective  of income2
redistribution,  which  can  be  attained  in  two  ways.  In  pay-as-you-go  systems  financed  by
worker contributions in the form of a payroll tax, there is a redistribution of income from the
employed to the unemployed.  Similarly,  the design of benefit minimums and maximums can
effect  a  redistribution;  in  a  contributory  scheme  with  flat  rate  contributions  and  capped
benefits,  workers  earning higher  salaries  subsidize those  earning  lower  wages.  While  it  is
preferable  that the link between contributions  and benefits be  close and transparent,  income
redistribution is consistent with the equity objectives pursued by socialist governments such as
those  found  in the transitional  economies  of Central  and Eastern  Europe  (CEE),  as well as
Algeria.  Unemployment  insurance  plays  a  crucial  role  in  the  transition  to  markets  by
facilitating industrial restructuring  and labor reallocation.  Most of the transitional economies
have  recently  implemented  UI  systems  with  the  goal  of  promoting  labor  shedding  while
providing income support to the affected population.
4.  The Central  and Eastern  European  systems.  The various  UI systems found  in CEE
have similar blueprints, which can be generalized as follows (see Table 1).  Firms contribute a
flat rate tax on the wage bill to a government-controlled  Social Fund, which is responsible for
financing  both  the payment  of benefits  as  well as  active labor  market  policies  such  as job
Table 1:  Characteristics  of Unemployment  Benefit Systems
in Central  and Eastern  Europe and Algeria
Country  Duration  of  Replacement  rate  Minimum  Maximum
____________  benefie1
_  _  _  _  _
Bulgaria  6-12  mo.  90-140%  of MW
Czech & Slovak  6 mo.  60% for 3 mo.  - 3,000 CSK
Republics  50% after 3
Hungary  12 mo. max.  75% for 3 mo.  8,600 HFTs  18,000  HFT
60% for 9 mo.  8,600 HFT  15,000  HFT
Poland  12 mo.; 18  mo. in  36% of avg. nat'l wage (-
crisis areas  MW)
Romania  9 mo.  60% for means-tested
populatiorn
70% for those w/ higher
education
Slovenia  2 years max.  70% for 3 mo.  80% of MW  4 times  MW
60% after  I
Algeria  i year min.  Declining  replacement  of MW-  75% of MW  3 times MW
3 years max.  weighted  "reference  salary" 6
MW  denotes  minimum  wage.
IX  After exhausting  benefits, can receive  a "social benefit" less than MW, e.g. in Hungary, Romania,
Slovenia.
21 Replacement  rate of average  wage earned  over the last  year of employment,  unless  otherwise  noted.
-/  70% replacement  if in retraining,  benefits  for 1 year.
4/ Eligible  population  earns < 50 % of MW.
5' Minimum  wage in Hungary  is 9,000 HFT (1993).
-'  For details, see para. 24 and Table 3.
Sources: Jackson,  Koltay,  and Biesbrouck,  1995;  World  Bank.3
training and placement programs.  The portion of the payroll tax that finances unemployment-
related charges is paid by the employer,  typically with no worker contribution.  The level of
benefits  is  set  proportionally  to  the  salary  earned  while  employed,  at  a  replacement  rate
ranging from  50-75 percent.  A uniform duration  of benefit eligibility  is common,  although
some systems use length of experience  to determine duration.  The maximum caps that apply
to duration range from 6 to  12 months in most CEE countries, with the longest duration found
in Slovenia, up to two years (see Table  1).  Despite the variety of system parameters,  the bias
toward  worker protection  is apparent  in the generosity of benefit  duration.  Considering the
highly  regulated  labor  markets  in  socialist  economies,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  newly
implemented Ul programs exhibit similarly protective features.
5.  Comparing  Algeria.  In  many  ways  Algeria's  system  is  similar,  but  with  notable
differences.  Benefits  are  financed  by  payroll  contributions  shared  by  employers  and
employees, but also by a mandatory  entry fee paid by firms.  The entry fee is proportional to
the worker's  salary and work tenure,  up to  maximum equivalent to  12 months'  salary,  thus
representing  a  significant  additional  cost  to  firms.  In  terms  of  benefit  structure,  duration
eligibility is generous relative to the CEE countries,  ranging from a one year minimum to a 3
year  maximum,  and  averaging  23  months.  These  parameters  clearly  favor  the  worker,
reflecting  the  social  priorities  of  a  centrally  planned  economy.  In  fact,  Algerian  workers
benefit  from  a  high  degree  of  labor  market  regulation.  Unlike  the  Ul  programs  found  in
Central and Eastern Europe, however,  Algerian firms incur a financial burden elsewhere borne
by the state (i.e. the Social Fund).  The benefit level in the Algerian system is determined by a
declining replacement rate of the "reference  salary",  calculated as the mean of the actual and
minimum wages (see para. 24 and Table 3 for a detailed discussion).  This formula leads to a
compression of benefits, but the minimum and maximum levels relative to minimum wage are
comparable to those found in other transitional economies.
6.  Early results in Central and Eastern Europe.  It is instructive to evaluate the success of
the  above  mentioned  UI  systems  in  obtaining  the  desired  objectives  in  an  effective  and
financially  viable  way.  Because the  Ul  systems have been  operating  for  several  years,  in
general since 1990-1991, it is particularly beneficial to study the effects on the labor market as
well as the performance of the economy.  Industrial production  suffered significant losses over
a  period of several years,  on the order  of 40 percent,  and unemployment  steadily  increased
from  negligible  unemployment  Table  2: The  CEE  Experience  1989-1993
to levels from  11-16 percent by  % Ab  % A  Unenmp. Average
1993  (see  Table  2).  The  Ind. VA  GNP/cap.  (1993)  Inflation
declines  in  output  may  be  Bulgaria  -39.5%  -46.2%  16.4%  104%
explained  by  both  aggregate  Czech Republic  -31.5%  -22.5%  3.5%  23%
and  relative  shocks.  Initial  Slovak Republic  -43.5%  -3.5%  14.4%  25%
shocks  at  the  aggregate  level,  Hungary  -9.0%  19.3%  12.1%  27%
such  as  liberalizing  prices,  Poland  -25.4%  na  16.4%  116%
currency  devaluations,  and  Romania  -37.1%  -49.7%  10.9%  1  143%
credit constraints,  led to higher  Source: World Bank  1/ 19944
costs of inputs, loss of competitiveness  and, for the first time, hard budget constraints  .]  After
some adjustment in production levels and reallocation of resources, various relative shocks
ensued.  Changes in relative costs and the collapse of domestic demand led to  additional
compression in productive activity, thus creating fiscal pressure.  The ensuing high inflation
proved destabilizing to  the macroeconomic situation (see Table 2).  The degree of labor
shedding over this tumultuous  period, however, was more moderate.  The decline in output
considerably  exceeded  the decline in employment,  signifying  continued  labor hoarding and soft
budget constraints initially,  with  reliance  on  attrition,  extended unpaid  vacation, early
retirement, and exit from the labor force.  The relatively moderate  rates of unemployment  can
be explained  by: (i) the discrepancy  between the level of official, registered unemployed,  and
the  level of  de facto  unemployed; (ii)  exit from the  labor force; and  (iii) measurement
problems associated with informal sector activity.  Labor  market surveys in  Russia,  for
example, yield significant discrepancies in the magnitude of unemployment  relative to the
official  numbers (Commander  and Yemtsov, 1995).
7.  The success of the new UI programs has not been uniform across the CEE countries.
Since initially implemented, several countries have adjusted the benefit parameters in  the
direction of tighter eligibility requirements, shorter durations or  lower replacement rates,
because of  spiraling costs, which led to  a  squeeze on financing for active labor market
policies.  Counterexamples are  provided by  Poland  and  Romania, which  experienced
particularly  high rates of unemployment  and declines  in living standards early in the transition
period.  Poland extended its duration maximum to  18 months in regions deemed to be in
particular  crisis, and Romania  added a "social benefit" provision at a very low level of support
(40 percent of the minimum wage, means-tested  only), to last 18 months in addition to the
regular benefit duration of up to  9 months, bringing the total duration to  greater than two
years.  Despite  the intention  to increase  protection of vulnerable  populations,  introducing  more
generous  benefits at critical stages of adjustment  is equivalent  to backtracking  on reforms, and
can have serious and persistent negative consequences  for the labor market.  The model
discussed  in the next section illustrates  the potentially  damaging  result of hysteresis in terms of
entrenched long-term unemployment  and the associated risk of marginalizing an important
segment  of the labor market.
Section  II: A Dynamic  Model  of the Labor  Market
8.  In  his recent  labor market analyses (Burda,  1988, 1992,  1993; Commander and
Coricelli, 1995) Michael Burda develops a model to  describe the effects of  various labor
market institutions in  a  unified framework, with the  goal of  analyzing the evolution of
unemployment  over the medium  and long terms.  Although  short-run price and demand shocks
are not unimportant, the model addresses the long-run dynamics of the labor market.  The
model is therefore useful in  describing economies in  transition whose labor markets are
undergoing  drastic change.
1/  Commander and Coricelli (1993) find that negative growth in output  is fairly uniform across sectors, suggesting
that aggregate shocks play a significant  role.5
9.  An economy's long-run equilibrium  in unemployment-job  vacancy space is determined
by the intersection  of the demand for jobs, depicted by the unemployment-vacancy  curve UV,
also known as the  Beveridge curve,  and the supply of vacancies curve VS, as  shown in
Figure 1.  The level of unemployment reaches a  steady state equilibrium when inflows to
unemployment caused by  separation (resulting from  lay-off or  shut-down) are  equal to
outflows  from unemployment  into job vacancies,  i.e.
u =  s (I-u) -x (u,v)=O,
where s represents  the separation  rate that applies to employed  workers (1-u), and x (u,  v) is the
matching  function that brings together  unemployed  workers and vacancies. The UV curve is a
continuum  of combinations  of u and v for which du/dt= u1=O. The UV locus is downward
sloping (as v declines, u increases), and convex to the origin.  An increase  in s will shift UV
outward to  a higher locus of  (u,v) combinations,  denoted UV'.  Similarly, a  less efficient
matching  functionx (-) will shift the UV curve away from the origin.
10.  The  VS  curve  describes  the
willingness  of firms to create jobs.  As such,  Figure  1
it is affected  by the incentives  introduced  by
labor market  regulations.  The  curve  is  V  VS
generally upward  sloping, because higher  V  V
unemployment means  a  decline  in  real
wages, making job  creation cheaper, and
also increases the probability of  finding a
worker to fill the vacancy.  External factors
such  as  increases in  workers'  bargaining
power,  interest rates,  real wage costs, UI  V
benefits, alternative income from informal  W-V
activities  and the cost of severance  payments  L  W
to  the  firms  will  rotate  the  VS  curve
clockwise to VS'.  In such an environment,  U
a  new equilibrium level of  unemployment
will be reached  where UV' and VS' intersect. This shift describes  the situation  encountered  in
the CEE transitional economies, where industrial restructuring entrained large scale lay-offs,
real interest rates climbed, output plummeted  and domestic  demand collapsed,  compounded  by
significant  shocks to the terms of trade, unions acquired greater power, and Ul systems were
implemented  that included  benefit payments  and severance packages. The result was a shift to
a new steady state of higher unemployment  and lower vacancies.
11.  In the framework of the model, alternative  policies can be introduced  to counteract the
shift to a high-unemployment  equilibrium.  The most effective  policy measures, borne out by
the experience in the Czech Republic, are active labor market policies.2 Acting on both the
2/  The Czech Republic  has the lowest U/V ratio among the CEE transitional  economies  (Boeri, 1994).6
demand and supply sides can mitigate the movements  described above. Job creation measures,
for example, such as public works schemes, wage subsidies, and tax incentives for private
firms,  will rotate the  VS curve up  and  left,  by  rendering vacancies more productive.
Similarly, requiring beneficiaries of unemployment insurance to  participate in job  training
improves the pool of those who can fill vacancies, which also has a positive effect on the
supply of vacancies.  Switching  to the demand side, the model captures the effects of active
employment  measures  that improve the efficiency of the matching  function  x (u,  v).  Measures
to  improve the  exchange of  information at  employment offices regarding vacancies and
training programs, as well as better monitoring  of the unemployed,  and retraining  programs to
eliminate  mismatch  (a common  problem in state-controlled  industries  which relied on obsolete
technology)  will effectively  cause the UV curve to shift inward toward the origin.  The model
therefore derives policy prescriptions in terms of active employment  policies because of their
positive influence  in mitigating  long-term  unemployment.
12.  Moving beyond a simple static version of the model, Burda incorporates  some dynamic
complexity in the process of job search and employment  decisions for workers and firms.
Evidence from both OECD and CEE countries suggests that a significant portion of labor
market movement  comes from job-to-job switches, without passing through unemployment.
The model incorporates on-the-job search into the unemployment  function, assuming that a
fraction H of the pool of employed workers actually look for a job while working, such that
the equilibrium  unemployment  condition  becomes
u=  s(1-u)=  (u/(u+I  (I-u)) * (x (u+fI  (I-u),v))  =  0,  for LiE (0,1).
Because  job-search is procyclical, fewer workers look for jobs as unemployment  worsens (i.e.
[1'  < 0,  and II" <  0).  The resulting UV curve is not strictly convex, and can be upward
sloping for high levels of u, as in Figure 2.  The intuition for this result lies in the fact that
high u means a smaller employed labor force,
and therefore fewer effective job  searchers,  Figure  2
such that vacancies  are greater.  There is no
concurrent  improvement in  the  matching  V
function, because high u causes congestion,
i.e. dx/du <  0.  On the supply side, the VS
curve  can  be totally differentiated to  yield
dv/du  >  0 initially, i.e.  for u=0,  but dv/du
turns negative assuming that HI  is sufficiently
responsive to  high  levels  of  u.  Firms'
incentive  to offer vacancies  diminishes at high  \ 
rates  of  unemployment because  there  are
fewer on-the-job seekers, such that vacancies
become less  "productive". Therefore, when  VS
job search behavior of workers in considered,
multiple equilibria are possible, as depicted in  I
Figure 2.7
13.  An enviromnent  in which multiple equilibria are possible raises questions vis-a-vis the
big bang theory of adjustment through wide-spread  labor compression.  Despite the positive
effect of facilitating  restructuring and introducing mobility  and adjustment  to the labor market
by  pushing workers  to  look  for jobs,  a  big  bang  risks  moving too  quickly  to  high
unemployment, diminishing the number of on-the-job seekers and discouraging job creation
among  firms.  However, higher unemployment  may actually slow the process of restructuring,
through lower job turnover, especially quits.  This argument makes the case for a big bang,
because it increases the returns to public enterprise restructuring.  Multiple equilibria can be
generated  by features other than on-the-job  search.  Bad public finance, for example, in which
UI benefits are set exogenously  and financed by a tax on firms which is raised in times of UI
fund short-fall, can lead to a downward sloping vacancy supply curve by raising firms' costs
of creating jobs.'  Artificially high wages and persistent soft budget constraints distort wage
signaling, which is crucial in determining employment  levels through its allocative  function.
The resulting high natural rate of unemployment is a path-dependent  equilibrium, implying
that a reversal of the policies or exogenous  shocks which led to its present steady state would
not return the economy  to its original equilibrium.
14.  This phenomenon  of a path-dependent  steady state is known as hysteresis, and in this
case means persistence  of a low level or undesirable equilibrium  over the long run.  The new
steady state equilibrium  depends not only "on the long-run values of the exogenous variables
(as usually) but also on the initial condition of each state variable" (Franz, 1990, p.110).
Hysteresis arises when negative shocks to the demand for labor are accompanied  or followed
by persistent negative supply side effects.  For example, after a  decline in labor demand,
hysteresis can result from the loss of human capital and negative labeling associated with
unemployment, leading to entrenched long-term unemployment.  Other supply side factors
which potentially  lead to hysteresis are structural rigidities in the labor market, illustrated  by a
4 lack of mobility across regions or industries , or the effect of generous workers' benefits on
the  decision to  remain employed and  abandon job  search.  Each example represents a
distortion in the agent's incentive  to act, with ultimately  negative and persistent consequences
for the economy. The analysis herein advises caution in designing labor market policies in an
environment in  which multiple equilibria are possible, because of the danger of hysteresis
associated  with low level equilibria.
Section  III: Objectives  of Unemployment  Insurance
15.  In designing  an effective Ul system, it is necessary  to delineate the desired objectives,
and to prioritize them according  to short-term and medium-term  measures. The transition  to a
market economy gives rise to specific and immediate needs that take precedence over more
infrastructural and market efficiency issues.  Short-run measures include strengthening  the
3/  Solvency  triggers found in the Ul systems  of most jurisdictions  in the U.S. have the same negative  dynamic  effects
by  raisingthe contributionrate during  periods of recession(see Worden and Vroman ,1991).
4/  In Central and Eastern Europe, rigidities in the housing market result from inadequate  property rights and a
lack of rental housing, for example.  In Algeria, mobility is constrained  by a severe housing  shortage.8
system of unemployment  insurance by simplifying  targeting and eligibility requirements, such
that it has the administrative  capacity to handle large numbers of participants.  Minimum
income support is  a  crucial element, and resources should be directed to  protecting the
minimum  level of benefits, which should be set at least equal to the country's poverty line for
individuals.  A flat benefit rate is  simplest to  establish, to  adjust, and to administer.  A
fundamental  goal of UI in the early stages of transition is to facilitate  enterprise restructuring,
labor  shedding and  reallocation toward  the  private  sector,  which can  be  motivated by
appropriate incentive structures for employers and employees by adjusting policy variables
such as the contribution structure, eligibility criteria, and benefit level and duration.  It is
essential that the program design takes account of alternative social safety net measures and
pension and non-wage  compensation  which influence  employment  decisions,  such that the new
UI system  has a consistent  incentive  structure and does not introduce  new distortions.
16.  Additional  policy options to be pursued in the short run concurrently with UI would
reinforce objectives  to mitigate the immediate  effects of unemployment. With an eye toward
the needs of individual  communities,  the state could diversify its overall employment  strategy
by  complementing the  centrali7ed UI  scheme with  decentralized programs designed for
particular regions.  Alternatives  include: (a) financial assistance and employment-generating
projects in areas devastated by mass layoffs or  shutdown of the main industrial employer;
(b) employment  subsidies  to maintain a minimum  level of productive activity on a temporary
basis; (c) public works schemes; (d) programs to  foster entrepreneurship and other local
economic  development. These programs are particularly challenging  to design and implement
because  they are inherently  complex  and expensive, they risk subsidizing  non-viable  activities,
and they perpetuate  the socialist  phenomenon  of over-dependence  on the state.
17.  In order to lay the groundwork  for medium-term  objectives  in the short run, they must
be integrated into the overall strategy and design of an UI scheme from the outset.  Goals for
the medium  term can be divided into three categories: (i) rationalize  the benefit structure of UI
such that it encourages participation and achieves broader coverage; (ii) implement active
employment policies such as retraining and redeployment  programs; and (iii) improve the
administrative  capacity of the UI and employment programs.  All three address improving
efficiency, whether at the program level, in operational terms, or at the market level, by
improving labor allocation  and mobility.  First consider the benefit structure of UI.  In order
to link directly contributions  and benefits such that individual  agents (both workers and firms)
finance their own insurance, contributions  should be shared between workers and employers,
with the employee  contribution  appearing on the pay slip.  In addition, the rate of contribution
should  mirror the benefits; a flat rate contribution  should  yield a flat rate cash transfer, while a
proportional contribution (i.e. a percentage of the gross wage) should yield benefits which
vary with salary, and are not subject to a maximum.  It  is possible to have a  two-pillar
approach which combines the two payment structures.  The main  reasons to  rationalize
benefits with  contributions are  to  foster  social integration, signal  responsibility of  the
individual, minimize distortions to  individual job  search and employment decisions, and
counteract evasion of the payroll tax.  On the employer side, lay-off behavior can be affected
by the contribution requirements;  experience rating, which is commonly used in the United9
States, determines the  contribution level based on  an  employer's history  of  generating
unemployment,  so that at least some of the cost of unemployment  is borne by the employer.
18.  The second category of medium-term  objectives  pertains to the efficient functioning  of
the labor market and labor mobility.  Unemployment  insurance is considered to be a passive
policy because it responds ex poste to a specific event of unemployment,  but does not act to
reduce the risk of  or correct that event in the  future.  Active labor market policies, by
contrast, are characterized by proactive measures designed to  find permanent solutions to
unemployment.  Job  creation, for example, can be  stimulated through public works and
temporary employment programs, or  on  a more permanent basis, through promoting the
private sector.  Programs which retrain workers in new technologies  or industries where price
and trade liberalization has generated higher demand are particularly useful in transitional
economies. Lessons  from Central and Eastern Europe reveal gaps in technological  knowledge,
in which the highly skilled labor force was trained for outmoded methods of production
rendered  noncompetitive  on international  markets. This was exacerbated  by production targets
inherited from the old system which were severely misaligned  with actual demand.  Structural
unemployment  is very costly in terms of lost production as well as income support. Retraining
programs, therefore, can facilitate labor reallocation  to correct sectoral imbalances  resulting
from the transition to an open economy.  Redeployment  and job brokering act in a similar
manner. Agencies  that provide information  services about  job openings and training programs
contribute to  labor mobility, especially among unskilled and semi-skilled workers.  While
active employment  programs are integral to a well-functioning  labor market, the drawbacks
include their limited scope of effectiveness  because they reach a narrow audience, and their
relatively  high cost.  In an environment  where multiple equilibria are possible, however, such
as when on-the-job search is present, the Burda model presented above demonstrates that
despite  the drawbacks, such active labor market policies are crucial to avoiding  low level, high
unemployment  equilibria.
19.  The  final  category  of  medium-term goals  consists  of  measures  to  increase
administrative  capacity. Some  advantages  to be gained are administrative  cost savings through
more effective contribution collection, faster and  more reliable delivery of  services and
benefits, which encourages  greater participation,  and increased  capacity for control, which will
diminish fraud.  All these contribute to reduce the costs of the system.  The steps which will
achieve these benefits are time- and labor-intensive, but can pay handsomely in terms of
improved system efficiency.  Fundamental steps include (a) replacing the enterprise as a
purveyor of benefits, which will result in more equity, greater transparency  of benefit levels,
and less fraud and leakage from the system; (b) establishing a system of  social insurance
records by individual worker and firm (e.g. issuing a social security identification  number);
(c) computerizing record-keeping in a central database that can be linked with other social
assistance program databases and used for cross-checking;  and (d) improving the delivery of
benefits.10
Section  IV: Algeria's  Unemployment  Insurance  System
20.  While the  objectives described in  the  previous  section pertain to  unemployment
insurance in the unconstrained  case, the issue of financial viability of the system complicates
the design of a UI scheme. During the process of economic  restructuring, the CEE countries
encountered financial pressure on  the system in the wake of extremely adverse economic
conditions, namely severe fiscal constraints, declines in output, increases in unemployment,
declining  living standards, and political  and social instability. This fragile situation  requires a
well-defined  strategy, and a separation  and prioritization  of goals by feasibility  (both financial
and administrative)  in the short run, and over the medium  term.  Above all, it is important  that
incomes policies and unemployment benefit structures be consistent with a  comprehensive
labor market strategy without introducing  adverse  incentives.
21.  This is a tall order, especially for Algeria.  Unlike its Central and Eastern European
counterparts, Algeria did not follow the socialist  model of full employment. In designing its
unemployment insurance system,  therefore,  it  faced  an  initial condition of  substantial
unemployment  (on the order of 24% of the labor force in 1994). However, by adopting  a new
scheme  in July 1994, the Algerian authorities  sought  three objectives: (i) to facilitate  enterprise
restructuring by encouraging labor shedding, (ii) to protect workers laid off for economic
reasons as  a result of restructuring; and (iii) to  gain political capital during a  period of
economic, social and political crisis.  These objectives represent imperatives that constrain
choices  in  designing the  system.  To  disregard these  elements might  exacerbate an
environment  already rife with social tension.
22.  Financing  structure.  The Algerian system of unemployment  insurance  is financed  by a
4 percent payroll tax shared by the employer and employee (2.5% and 1.5%, respectively)  as
well as a one-time payment  of entry fees by firms for each eligible worker, paid at the time of
lay-off.  The amount of entry fee is proportional to the worker's salary history over the last
year  of  employment as  well  as  his/her  tenure  of  work  experience.  Although  the
Unemployment  Insurance Fund is a public institution, it is fiscally independent  of the central
government.  It administers benefits, processes claims, and manages the fund's reserves.
Financed  entirely by payroll tax contributions  and entry fees, it does not administer  or finance
any active labor market policies such as job training or placement schemes, nor does it have
recourse to government funding in periods of reserve shortfalls.  Instead, it must amend its
contribution and benefit parameters to  restore financial viability.  Although nominally
separate from Treasury support, the government in effect subsidizes  the UI fund through it's
payroll tax on the public administration  wage bill; public servants make up almost half of the
eligible labor force, but they are not de facto subject to lay-off.  Because benefits are capped
(at 3 times the minimum  wage), the flat rate contribution  constitutes an income redistribution
from higher wage earners to those actually laid off.  While a closer link between contributions
and benefits would minimize any disincentive  to participate in the unemployment  insurance
system, the Algerian scheme's mandatory participation and redistributive benefit design are
intended to  promote social solidarity in  a  country where  social welfare is  central to
determining  policy.I1
23.  Although Algeria's system of UI shares its basic contributory structure and benefit
design with many CEE and OECD countries, it incorporates two innovative features.  The
first concerns the payment of an entry fee by the employer to the UI fund, proportional  to the
worker's salary history and job tenure, such that the firm's lay-off decision takes account of
the cost of lay-off. 5 This serves to boost fund reserves  by covering more than half of the total
stream of monthly indemnities  to be paid to the beneficiary. The firm's requirements  include a
lump sum severance package equivalent to three months' salary, followed by an entry fee
equal to 80 percent of the monthly salary for each year of work experience greater than three
years, up to a maximum  equivalent  to 12 months' salary (Table 3 contains details of system).
This represents a significant financial burden to  the enterprise, which is also required to
present a restructuring plan to  its worker participation committees for negotiation, and to
assemble the administratively  cumbersome  application for eligibility to  Ul benefits for each
employee.  The  new  system  was  implemented to  facilitate enterprise restructuring by
encouraging  labor shedding. The cost of layoffs may prove prohibitively expensive  for firms,
however.  This evidently played a role in  the former system of  severance packages; the
combination  of high up-front costs (15 months' salary due at the  moment of separation),  labor
promotion  policies of the government, and soft budget constraints faced by public enterprises
6 discouraged large scale participation.  Because the maximum entry fee plus severance pay
owed by firms did not change, any cost savings of the new system comes from spreading
charges over time, thereby easing liquidity  constraints.
24.  Benefit structure.  The second innovative feature involves the benefit structure, which
is  characterized by  a  benefit  level proportionate to  salary  history,  and  a  progressive
replacement rate of over the eligibility period.  The benefit level is based on a reference
salary, equal to the average  of the monthly salary earned over the last year of employment  and
the  minimum wage.  While the  link between salary-related contributions and benefits is
apparent, there is de facto compression  of the reference wage, in favor of lower wage  earners.
The upper and lower bounds on benefit level span a fairly narrow range, and thus eliminate
any perverse income redistribution effects while providing a  more than sufficient level of
protection to the affected population.  The replacement rate of the reference salary declines
over  the  4  quarters  which  make  up  the  eligibility period,  starting  with  100  percent
replacement, followed by 80, 60, and finally 50 percent replacement in the last quarter.
Although  this  graduated structure  encourages job  search,  any  positive  incentives are
overwhelmed  by the generous limits on duration. The system administers indemnity  payments
for a period proportional to work history, but for a minimum  of one year, and as long as three
years.  The fact that the eligible worker receives near-full  replacement  (90% on average)  for at
least 6 months, and possibly as long as 18 months, effectively  nullifies any incentive  to seek
new employment.  Long benefit periods,  longer than those found  in  other  transitional
economies,  encourage  attachment  to unemployment,  and risk exacerbating  unemployment  over
5/  This is similar to the experience rating found in various Ul systems in the U.S.  However, the Algerian system
does not perfectly internalize the cost of lay-off into the employer's decision in the event that a worker quickly
finds alternative employment. The old employer is still required to pay the entry fee, even though the Ul fund
pays no benefits to the worker concerned.
6/  Large-scale lay-offs also required union support.12
Table  3:  The Algerian  Unemployment  Insurance  System
Zilgibility0  i~terla  fort waster  Eligibit  requirem  entifor  employer
Laid off for economic  reasons  (i.e. involuntarily);  Firm must be current in payment of SS
contributions  and Ul contributions;
Receives  no other revenue, except for unpaid
leave;  Firms with > 9 employees  must present
employment  reduction  or restructuring  plan (volet
Ineligible  for early or regular retirement;  social)  to workers' participation  committees  and to
Affiliated  with Social Security  system for at least  labor unions  for agreement, for negotiation  and
3 years;  mediation,  with recourse  to arbitrage;
Paid UI contributions  for at least 6 months  prior to  Lay-off  decision for each employee  includes
lay-off;  severance  package, notification  of Ul fund, and
payment of entry fee;
Does not refuse  job offer or reconversion;  Entry fee is equal to 80% of the gross monthly
salary for each year of work experience  over three
years, up to a maximum  of 12 months salary (i.e.
18 years of tenure).
Employer  paid the entry fee to the UT  fund;
Initial  payment equivalent  to 2 months salary must
be paid up front, with the balance to be paid over
the following  year;
Registered  "job seeker" with employment  office  Failure to comply results in penalties  ranging from
for at least 3 months.  5,000-10,000  DA per worker.
0  Severance  pay equal to 3 months salary, paid in lump sum by employer  directly to the worker;
0  Benefits  are subject to employee  portion of SS contributions;
0  Continued  eligibility  for health insurance, maternity  benefits, family benefit;
0  Duration  period equal to 2 months per year of UI contributions  paid to the last employer: 12 month
minimum,  36 month  maximum;
0  Monthly  reference salary  equal to 12  * (gross monthly  salary+ minimum  wage);
0  Duration  period is divided into 4 equal quarters;
0  Graduated  replacement  rate of the monthly  reference salary:
100% during the 1st quarter of duration  period;
80% during 2nd quarter;
60% during 3rd quarter;
50% during 4th quarter;
0  Benefit  level minimum  = 75 % of the minimum  wage, maximum = 3 times the minimum  wage;
0  After exhaustion  of benefits, continued  eligibility  for health insurance and family benefits  for one
year.13
the long term by shifting the labor market to a higher rate of steady state unemployment.  The
average  duration  of  unemployment  for
Algerian workers age 25 and older exceeds  Figure 3
the  global  average,  which  suggests  a
tendency toward entrenchment  for the long-
term  unemployed. Evidence from  Central
and Eastern Europe indicates that flows out
of unemployment  to jobs are low, and that
new  hiring  is  characterized  by  job-
switching, without recourse to the pool of
unemployed workers.  The labor market in  \JV
Algeria appears to be moving toward a low
employment  equilibrium in an environment
of  multiple  equilibria,  illustrated  in  VS
Figure 3.  Even before  implementing the  l
new  Ul  system,  unemployment  has  1995  U
increased  steadily over the last decade, from
17  percent  of  the  labor  force  in  1986, to  24  percent by  1994.  The  dynamics of
unemployment,  with the interplay of on-the-job  search, describe a gloomy  picture for the labor
market in the long run.
25.  The principle weakness of the Algerian UI system stems from its heavy reliance on
firms to finance the process of industrial restructuring. The incentive  structure is problematic
because it seeks to facilitate restructuring through labor compression, but at the same time
imposes  a considerable  burden on firms.  The level of labor market regulation  and taxation is
significant:  employers pay 24 percent of the wage  bill in taxes.'  Adding the worker portion of
payroll contribution raises the level of taxation to 31.5%8, which ultimately costs workers in
the form of lower real wages.  This may inhibit private sector development in the formal
sector, as firms evade taxes through informal  sector activity. The potential  costs to firms who
lay  off employees (i.e.  severance pay,  entry  fees,  and  administrative procedures) may
discourage  labor shedding. Although  the system is relatively  new, initial indications  of a rapid
pick-up in separations  during the first year of operation suggest that the cost to enterprises is
not prohibitive.  These  early  results, however,  may reflect the  recessionary conditions
prevailing over  the last several years, and the imperative to  restructure enterprises in an
economy  in the process of transition.
26.  Risk of  a  high  unemployment equilibrium.  The strongest conclusion reached in
analyzing  the Algerian system of unemployment  insurance  is that the labor market is in danger
of reaching  a high unemployment  equilibrium  which will have a lasting  effect on the economy.
7/  Taxes include social security, accident  insurance,  pension and early retirement  in addition  to unemployment
insurance.
8/  An additional  2.5% is paid by workers to unions to finance the firm's social fund (oeuvres sociales)
administered  by the union.14
Although  the system's  stated objectives of facilitating restructuring  and protecting  those  laid
off do not specifically address the labor market in the long run,  they have serious implications
for  it.  Facilitating restructuring  concerns productive  efficiency of  the industrial  sector,  but
ignores the labor component.  Similarly, the UI system provides  income support to those laid
off,  but  effectively  promotes  attachment to  unemployment,  thus  introducing  an  element  of
stagnation to  the labor market.  While the Ul  system cannot  be expected to address  a broad
range  of  issues,  and  would  be  most  successful  with  specifically  targeted  objectives,  it  has
explicit,  non-neutral  implications  for  the  labor  market.  This  can  be  explained  by  the
authorities'  over-riding  objective  of  providing  income  support  during  a  politically  unstable
period.
27.  Returning  to  the  framework  of the  Burda model,  the  potential for  hysteresis  can be
illustrated in the dynamic context of unemployment and benefits.  In what he terms "passively
reactive unemployment benefits",  the benefit level responds to labor market conditions.  This
feedback  can  be  explained  by  political  economy  arguments,  wherein  a  worsening  of
unemployment  will  lead  the  authorities  (pressured  by  voting  or  popular  support)  to  raise
benefits.9 Steady state unemployment is reached when flows into U are equal to flows out of
U, i.e.
u  =  s (I-u) -uf  =  0,  wheref=  flows out of U.
Further,  an increase in the rate of U will increase the level of benefits, such that
du/dt  = x * db/dt,  where X >  0,
implying an upward sloping UB curve.  Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of the labor market
when a shock such as a decline in productivity causes the UB curve to shift outward to UB'.
The dynamics of the system out of steady state, depicted by the arrows, suggest that a shock to
the system results  in a higher unemployment equilibrium  locus,  as well as an increase  in the
level of U and benefits (from initial point E1 to new steady state E2).  A derivation of the roots
of the dynamic system of equations yields a zero root,  which is equivalent to hysteresis.  Even
if  Algeria  were  to  lower  benefits  in  the face of  higher  unemployment  in  order  to  maintain
financial viability and fiscal independencel°, hysteresis  would result.  Reversing the situation
above, such that du/dt=  a  * db/dt,  for a  <  0, the UB curve now slopes downward, as shown
in Figure  5.  The same negative shock to productivity  shifts the curve  out to  UB',  and the
movement of  (u,b) outside of steady state, depicted by the arrows,  shifts down and out,  to  a
new equilibrium of lower benefits and higher unemployment.  The analysis demonstrates  the
potential  for  hysteresis  in  the  Algerian  labor  market,  and  raises  the  issue  of  which  labor
9/  Burda cites the recent evidence  of Democratic  administrations  in the U.S., during whose  tenure Ul benefit
durations were temporarily  increasedduring  recessionaryperiods. He also notes  the extensionand increases  in
benefits  over the last two decades  in most EC member  countries  experiencing  high unemployment.
10/  The legislationpermits  changing  benefit  and/or contributionparametersto  improve financial  solvency,  although
one could argue that lowering  benefits  is politically  untenable.15
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market  institutions  should be  adopted,  and what  policies can counteract  the tendency toward
hysteresis.
Section V:  Financing Costs of the Algerian System
28.  From  the viewpoint of the early  stages of  industrial restructuring,  the Algerian  labor
market  faces  potentially  high  layoffs,  with  consequences  for  the  current  UI  system.
Recognizing  that  the  system's  eligibility  criteria  limit the  scope  of  effectiveness  to  only  a
fraction of the labor force, an analysis of future costs and the financial viability of the system
is  useful,  both  for  planning  and  for  evaluating  the  efficiency  of  the  contribution-benefit
parameters.  A model  was constructed  to  measure  the  Ul  fund's  solvency  by  simulating a
variety of unemployment scenarios and the resulting impact on the Ul fund balance.
29.  Financing  model  simulations.  The  financing  model  replicates  the  parameters  of
Algeria's  system  by  tracking  flows  into  unemployment,  flows  out  of  unemployment,  the
distribution  of benefit levels,  the average  level  of entry fees and  its payment  over time,  the
distribution  of wages of the employed population,  and the relevant payroll contribution.  The
model tracks the evolution of the fund parameters quarterly,  over the short and medium terms,
specifically  1995 through  1999.  The UI fund balance in period t is defined to be equal to the
positive financial inflows resulting from the payroll tax and entry fees,  minus the outflows to
benefit payments,  social security payments for eligible beneficiaries,  administrative costs and
the  UI  fund balance  carried  over  from  the  previous  period  t-1.'  The base  case  scenario
assumes that 270,000  workers are laid off over  the next two years.  This level, equivalent to
10 percent of the currently employed work force affiliated with social security (i.e. the formnal
sector), is consistent with layoff rates experienced in the CEE countries undergoing transition.
The resulting financial position of the unemployment insurance fund is positive and increasing
over time.  While the Algerian system is similar to those found in other countries,  it differs in
11/  Details of the model and parameter assumptions  behind  the base case scenario  are found in the attached  annex.
N.B.  The model replicates  the legal parameters  of the system and assumes  universal  compliance.16
two  significant ways:  (i)  the  UI  fund  only  finances the  payment of  indemnities and
administrative  costs, with no funding of active labor market policies such as training; and
(ii) the design of the entry fee paid by the employer is unique to Algeria.  The level of the
entry fee  represents a  significant cost to  firms,  although slightly lower  than previously
required in the form of  severance pay.  The projected positive balance of the Ul  fund is
partially due to the high entry fee required for each retrenched  worker, because it covers more
than half of the total stream of monthly indemnities  to be paid to the beneficiary. However, if
the system was financed uniquely by employer and employee contributions generated by a
payroll tax, the balance would still be positive, although considerably  lower (on the order of
fifty percent lower in 1999).
30.  Sensitivity  analysis. While the base case depends on reasonable  assumptions  regarding
the evolution of employment, wage inflation, and average duration of unemployment,  inter
alia, sensitivity  analysis was performed to determine the robustness  of the financial  situation.
In an environment  of wage inflation, for example, provided that minimum  wage increases do
not outpace economy-wide inflation 12,  the  UI  fund balance grows more quickly than the
increase in benefit outlays, which are fixed at the moment  of admission  for the entire benefit
period. The risk in an inflationary environment, therefore, is not to the solvency of the UI
fund, but rather to the beneficiaries, whose real income would be eroded.  The analysis
concludes that the financial position of the Ul fund would be stable under a wide range of
profiles of unemployment. Finally, to evaluate the limits of sustainability,  a low case scenario
was considered. The resulting Ul fund balance is projected to be positive for each year in the
medium term; the initial build-up of reserves from contributions  and entry rights in 1995 and
1996 off-sets the net negative flows projected for  1997 and 1998.  Although the financial
viability of the system could withstand a combination  of negative  conditions, the fund balance
would turn negative in the case of extremely high layoffs (on the order of 20 percent) in the
short run.
31.  A simulation  of the base case scenario with a shorter maximum  duration of 18 months,
and an entry fee calculated  at half the former rate yields a Ul fund balance that is positive and
financially  sound. In the event of negative shocks  which threaten the fund's financial  position,
parameters  may be adjusted to increase  the reserve level. The UI legislation  contains a general
solvency provision for adjusting contribution and benefit rates in  case financing becomes
insufficient. This provision needs to be made explicit, however.  A danger encountered  with
solvency  provisions is the timing of the trigger, and the time lag between the discrete decision
and the date of effectiveness  of the new regulations.  Ad-hoc treatment and long delays can
have serious  consequences for  the  fund's  solvency, and  could jeopardize  its  long-term
viability.  The Burda model discussed above describes the serious consequences  for the labor
market in the case of bad public finance.  Raising the payroll tax rate during recessionary
periods can generate multiple equilibria, with the economy arriving at a high unemployment
steady state, illustrated in Figure 2.  Even reducing  the benefit level can result in hysteresis at
12/  This  was not the case in Algeria  during the recessionary  period from 1991  to 1994,  however,  because  the
authorities  increased  the minimum  wage in real terms, giving  rise to wage inflation.17
high unemployment  levels in the event of negative shocks to productivity, as demonstrated  in
the example  described in the previous section.
Section  VI: Conclusion
32.  The analysis of the Algerian unemployment  insurance system presented here evaluates
the system's ability to affect employment  decisions of both firms and workers, to promote
enterprise restructuring with careful regard to  long-term labor market implications, and to
finance itself, in order to estimate the future evolution of the unemployment  crisis in Algeria.
The main conclusion can be summarized  as follows: industrial restructuring has serious and
persistent implications  for the labor market, and in an environment  where multiple equilibria
are possible, there is a real danger that a hysteretic, high unemployment  equilibrium  will be
reached. This serves as cautionary  advice when designing  policies  that affect the evolution of
unemployment in an economy.  The big bang experience of  structural adjustment in  the
transitional  economies of Central and Eastern Europe resulted in large scale unemployment;
despite considerable progress  in  restructuring,  labor  markets are  still  characterized by
structural rigidities as well as persistent long-term unemployment. Boeri (1993) labels this
phenomenon "transitional" unemployment, and argues that it is very  difficult to  eliminate
through reintegration into the labor force.  The Algerian labor market is characterized by
rigidities and  regulation similar  to  those  found  in  the  CEE  countries,  but  unlike  its
counterparts, it faces the challenging initial condition of high unemployment.  While this
magnifies  the need for effective  policies, it also raises the risk of failure.
33.  The big  bang approach has  advantages in  speed of  adjustment, but  its  negative
consequences  for unemployment  may prove too costly for the economy, especially in view of
its persistent nature.  A  more moderate "mixed bang"  approach incorporates the  active
employment  measures  that mitigate entrenched  unemployment. One of the crucial functions  of
these policies is to  maintain or  enhance human capital through working (i.e. learning-by-
doing), thus  avoiding the  skill obsolescence that  accompanies idleness.  Programs that
introduce  flexible working-time  arrangements  succeed in maintaining  a degree of attachment  to
the labor force which, however minor, enables workers to avoid the traps associated with
long-term unemployment. The policies adopted in the CEE aimed to reduce labor supply in
the short run in order to ease employment  pressures in an environment  of overemployment  and
labor hoarding inherited from the old regime. The resulting  decline in labor force participation
is undesirable  in the medium term, however, because of the associated  budget costs of social
assistance, and the productivity limits imposed on  the labor market.  Although the  CEE
countries typically  have very high participation rates for both men and women, Algeria does
not.  In fact, while 80 percent of working  age men are in the labor force, the participation  rate
for women is only 10 percent.
34.  To minimize the risk of marginalizing  an important segment of the labor force, active
labor market policies should be pursued from the outset to address transitional  unemployment
typically  arising from enterprise restructuring.  Empirical  evidence from several cross-country
studies (Burda, 1988; Jackman, et  al.,  1990)  suggests a  significant negative correlation
between average unemployment  rates and expenditure on active labor market policies. The18
most striking conclusions that emerge from  the CEE experience are that (i) unemployment is
not  necessary to  enterprise  restructuring  and  labor  market  adjustment  (since private  sector
vacancies are filled by job-to-job shifts, without recourse to the unemployment pool (Jackman,
1994)),  and (ii) growing  long-term unemployment  is self-fulfilling  and results  in higher  and
persistent unemployment (described by a permanent outward  shift of the Beveridge curve due
to  deterioration  of  the  matching  function  (Boeri,  1994)).  Although  active  employment
measures are costly and have relatively  low rates of return  in the short run,  Lehmann  (1995)
concludes that they can be  marginally effective when  pursued  strategically.  Although  more
analysis on the effectiveness of active employment measures  is needed (thus far the evidence
has been mixed), they represent a means to mitigate the negative impact of large-scale lay-offs,
thus  avoiding the  low-level  equilibrium  trap.  The  labor market  strategy  in Algeria  should
incorporate supply side policies to promote job  creation and stimulate the development of the
private  sector,  in  order  to  establish the pre-conditions  for  an agile  labor market  in the  long
run.19
Annex:  The Financing Model and Base Case  Scenario
The Unemployment Insurance Fund balance (UIF) in period t is defined as follows:
UIFt =  a3Wt  +  [COD 2 mos *St (1-u0)I  +  [ij=j4(CODbahance  t-i *  S,-i (1-ut  i))]  +  G t -B , -SSt  -At -Tt
+ UIFt-  + r(UIF t  1)
where  cc,  employer payroll contribution;
a2 employee payroll contribution;
a3 Cal +  2 ;
W  wage bill  =  Employed labor force * wage distribution;
COD  = entry fee (contribution d'ouverture des droits), paid for each new entrant to UI
system in period t, in a lump sum equivalent to 2 months salary up front (i.e. in
period t), with the balance paid over the next 4 quarters;
s  = separation rate;
u =  level of unemployment, equivalent to the rate of unemployment,  as % of labor
force;
(1-u) =  employed labor force, where total labor force in normalized to  1;
G =  government subsidy for G >0;  transfer to government for G <0;
B = total benefits paid out, equal to Xbi  , V recipients i;
SS =  social security contribution paid by the UI fund acting as employer for each
beneficiary;
A  administrative costs;
T  training costs;
UIFt l  =  UI fund balance from the previous period;
r =  nominal rate of return on invested UIF t, .
The  financing  model  tracks  the  inflow  of beneficiaries  to  the  UI system,  based  on
exogenous assumptions about the lay-off rate over the period of restructuring,  considered to be
from  1995 through  1999.  Estimates of entry fee payments (based on wage and work history
averages)  are tracked,  and the benefit  stream for the entire  duration period  is calculated.  In
addition,  the monthly payroll tax is calculated, based on the evolution  of the employed labor
force and assumptions about wage inflation.  The model tracks financial flows into and out of
the Ul  fund, calculates the Ul fund balance quarterly,  and carries  the balance forward to the
following period.20
The base case scenario depends  on the following  assumptions:
al  = 2.5%;
a2 =  1.5%;
a3 =  al  +  a2 =  4%;
The wage  distribution  here reflects average  monthly  wages for each sector:
10% of labor force earn the minimum  wage (SNMG, amounting  to 4000 DA);
20.5% earn 9700 DA;
16.8% earn 10,680 DA;
21.5% earn 10,900 DA;
26.2% earn 12,080 DA; and
5.0% earn 21,191 DA;
Wage inflation =  10% in 1995, 7% in 1996, 4.6% in 1997, 4% in 1998, 4% in 1999;
COD is proportional  to salary and work history. It is calculated  to be 80 % of the
worker's gross monthly salary for each year of work experience  over 3 years,
up to a maximum  of 12 months' salary (i.e. 18 years of tenure);
s =  10 percent of the labor force in the formal sector (3 270,000) from 1995-1997;
u=  initial unemployment  = 25 %; assume that the base unemployment  rate remains
25% outside of lay-offs  associated  with restructuring  (i.e. no specific
assumptions  regarding outflow  from the labor force into early retirement  or
inactivity,  or inflow of school leavers);
G  =  0,  i.e. no link with the central government  budget;
Average duration of benefits  equal to 30 months, with standard deviation  of 4 months;
assume that outflows  from unemployment  pool follow a normal distribution;
SS =  15% of SNMG for each beneficiary;
A =0;
T =0;
UIFt  1 is not invested (- r = 0);
Population  growth of 2.5 % in 1995, 2.2% thereafter;
Perfect compliance,  such that all those affiliated  with Social Security (i.e. all those in
the formal sector)  comply with the payroll tax.21
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